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IN

The Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah
CLARABELL KELLEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION
CO:J[p ~\XY, a corporation, and
GREE~
CAB TRAXSPORTATIOX CO:JIP A~Y, a corporation,
and LE\YIS BARTLEY,

Case No. 6329

Defendants and Appellants

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff complained that on the lOth day of February, 1940, she employed a taxicab owned and driven
by the defendants to transport her and her infant son
from the :Medical Arts Building on South Temple Street
in Salt Lake City, to her home at 921 'Vest Third ~ orth
Street, in said city, for which service she paid the regular fare; that the driver proceeded west on South Temple Street from the Medical Arts Building in a careless
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and negligent manner and particularly that he operated hif cab at a high and excessive rate of speed, to-wit,
in excess of 35 miles an hour, and that as said cab ap.
proached the intersection of South Temple and First
\Vest Streets, it was traveling at such excessive rate of
speed; that the driver failed to keep a proper lookout for
traffic upon South Temple and First West Streets, and
particul::uly over the intersection thereof, and failed to
retard his speed as he approached the intersection so
that he might stop if an emergency arose; that as the cab
entered the intersection of South Temple and First \Vest
Streets, another automobile traveling across the intersection traversed said intersection immediately in front
of said taxicab; that in order for said defendant Bartley
to avoid a collision with said other automobile, it became
necessary for him to suddenly apply his breaks, which
he did without warning, throwing the plaintiff from the
rear seat against the back of the front seat and into the
bottom of the cab, by reason whereof she sustained the
injuries of which she complains, to-wit, bruises and contusions of the arms and legs, a severe twist and wrench
of her back, excruciating pain and nervous shock.
The answer of the defendants denied negligence and
also denied any damage whatsoever to the plaintiff, and
alleged as a special and affirmative defense that shortly
after February 10, 1940, the plaintiff asserted to the defendants that she had suffered injuries because of an
accident which occurred on that date, and asserted that
the accident occurred because of some fault on the part
of defendants' driver; that the defendants at said time
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denied that there had been any negligence, and denied
that there was any responsibility, but nevertheless, in
order to fully compose and settle the dispute and to discharge any possible claims that the plaintiff might have
against the defendants, on February 21, 1940, paid to the
plaintiff the sum of $20.00, of which sum the plaintiff
acknowledged receipt in writing, and in consideration
thereof, released and forever discharged the defendants,
and each of them, from all claims, damages and rights
of action of every kind and character growing out of the
incident complained of.
In reply the plaintiff admitted that on February 21,
1940, the defendants tendered to her the sum of $20.00,
but denied that she released and discharged the defendants. She admits in her reply (Tr. 12-14, Ab. 11) that
she signed the release, but alleges that her signature
thereto was procured by misrepresentation and fraud,
and alleges that the misrepresentation and fraud consisted of agents of the defendants stating to her that
she would not be able to recover any damage against
them by reason of her injuries, and that 1mless she signed
the release, they would pay her no sums for her injuries,
nor would they pay the doctor bHl for services rendered
or to be rendered to her, nor would they pay any further
expense of any kind, and that it was by reason of such
mis-statements made by agents of the defendants that
she signed the paper, which she did without knowing the
contents thereof, by reason of which facts the plaintiff
claims that she is not bound by the release.
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II.
The
follows:

r~~ets

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
material to a decision of the cause are as

On February 10, 1940, the plaintiff had taken her
young son to the Medical Arts Building to have some
teeth extracted. (Tr. 47, Ab. 14.) When the boy was
able to leave, she called a cab and went downstairs and
waited unt:I the cab came for her. She and the child got
in to the cab, \Yhich turned in the intersection between
:\lain and State Streets, and started west on South Temple. The cab was traveling at a rate of 20 to 22 miles per
hour. (Tl'. 102, Ab. 27.) As the cab approached the
intersection of First \Vest and South Temple Streets
(Tr. 101, Ab. 26) there vv-ere two cars stopped waiting
to go through. The driver slackened his speed until he
got within about 30 feet of the cars in front of him, when
they went on through. lie followed them. He looked to
the left and it was clear as far as he could see, and he
looked to the right, and it was clear. As he proceeded
through, however, a car fron1 the left came up in front of
him going about 40 miles an hour. He could see that he
couldn't get through, so he put on the brakes and stopped.
Mrs. Kelley (Tr. 48-9, Ab. 14) saw the car dash in
front of them, but she couldn't see which car it was.
She testified (Tr. 47, Ab. 14) that at the time the cab entered the intersection it was going 25 to 30 miles an
hour; that when the brakes were put on, she was thrown
off the seat and against the back of the front seat. There
is no dispute about the fact that the brakes were put on,
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and that the rab stopped quite suddenly. The plaintiff
testified (Tr. 49, Ab. 15) that she got in touch with Mr.
Boynton of the cab company and told him of the accident;
that he asked her if she knew Dr. Landenburger or Dr.
Ross Anderson or Dr. Spencer "\Vright, to which she said
no; that ~Ir. Boynton sent her to Dr. Wright on the afternoon of February 13, 1940, and that he made an examination of her. Dr. \Yright testified (Tr. 88, Ab. 23)
that :Jirs. Kelley came to his office on February 13th or
14th, 1940, and that he examined her; that she complained
of pain in the lumbar region of her back; that she was
thoroughly examined and it was found that she had some
sore muscles ; that there ·were no other injuries and her
injury could only be determined by her complaint of pain;
that there was no evidence on the skin of any bruising
or injury; that (Tr. 89) no X-ray was advisable; that
he gave her an electrical treatment, strapped up her back
to support the muscles; that he had a number of telephone conversations with her and examined her again
after an interval of possibly two days, and discovered the
same condition as reported before. That he would expect the condition he found to heal itself in a week or
two; that she appeared to be an extremely nervous type
of person, and that that condition had existed for some
6me; that it was not caused by the accident.
Dr. Howard T. Anderson, a witness produced on behalf of plaintiff, testified (Tr. 74, Ab. 20) that the plainEff came to him about the last of February, 1940, for an
X-ray examination; that he took an X-ray ·which showed
no bony injury to any of the parts of the body comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plained about, and that no bony injury was discernible
in thu X-ray, that a few days later, he examined her at
her hon1e, and that she complained of tenderness in the
back and the lumbar region, and he told her that he
thought her injury was a mild sacro strain of the back
muscles, and that the treatment should be rest, with heat
applied; that she told him she had been thrown against
the seat of a cab (Tr. 75, Ab. 21) and since that time,
she had had pain in her back; that that could have caused
her injury.
Ruby 0 'l{eefe, a witness called on behalf of the
plain tiff, testified ( Tr. 78, _A_ b. 21) that she went to the
plaintiff's hon1e during February, 1940, and rendered
services there; that on the 14th of February, 1940, when
she arrived, Mrs. Kelley was in bed, and that during the
week she stayed there, Mrs. Kelley remained in bed, and
that Mrs. Kelley had agreed to pay her $1.00 a day.
Mrs. Kelley testified (Tr. 50, Ab. 15) that after she
had been examined by Dr. Wright, she had a nervous
chill and went home, and went to bed; that the Relief
Society teachers came in and got her extra help, which
she had to pay for; that (Tr. 51) she is indebted to Miss
O'Keefe for $7.00; that the other lady who came in was
there three days, and she owes her $1.00 a day for each
day. That (Tr. 54, Ab. 1'6) she has not recovered, and
her back still bothers her if she does extra hard work or
much lifting or walking.
The above statement covers in general the evidence
relating to the circumstances and nature of the injury
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complained of. \Ve shall now direct our attention to a
consideration of the release pleaded in defendants' answer and introduced in evidence as defendants' Exhibit
1. That document reads as follows:
''RELEASE
''For the sole consideration of Twenty
($20.00) and XOjlOOths DOLLARS and other valuableuable considerations, the receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged, I do hereby release and foreYer discharge the Salt Lake Transportation Company. the Green Cab Transportation Company
and Louis Bartley, Cab Driver, from all claims,
demands and rights of action of any kind whatsoever, which I now have or can have on account
of injury to person or damage to property ·or expenses or loss of services sustained by me, or
which may hereafter arise, in consequence of an
accident which occurred on or about the tenth day
of February, 1940, at the intersection of South
Temple and First West Streets, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
''It is agreed that the payment of the above
sum and other valuable considerations is not to
be construed as an admission by or on behalf of
the above named parties of any liability on account of said accident.
"Executed at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 21st
day of February, 1940.
~fRs. CLARABELL UTLEY K_ELLEY ( Sgd.)

~fRS.

1L \V.

ALLRED ( Sgd.)

\Vitness''
The plaintiff admitted (Tr. 61, Ab. 17) that the signature ''Clara bell Utley l{elley'' thereon is her signahue; that she signed it in the presence of l\Ir.c.:. Allred)
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the witness thereto, on the 21st day of February, 1940;
that when she signed it, she received $20.00 in cash. In
addition to this (Tr. 60, Ah. 17) she was to be entitled to
choose her own doctor and the defendant companies
would pay for it; that (Tr. 62, Ab. 17) both Dr. Reese
and Dr. Anderson were doctors of her own choosing. The
plaintiff testified (Tr. 63, Ab. 17) that it was a week or
longer after she was injured that Mr. Boynton and the
other gentleman came to her house; that she was hurting
all over and her back was bothering her, and she was
sick and nervous when they came; that they told her they
would allow her $20.00 for help that she told them she
was entitled to more than that; (Tr. 64, Ab. 18) that she
had already called her attorney, Mr. Shields, and Mr.
Boynton told her it didn't matter whether she employed
an attorney or not, and that if she didn't take the $20.00,
she 1.vould get nothing at all. They asked her if she had
employed an attorney, and she said, "'Veil, they had discussed an attorney." That they told her she would get
no more medical attention unless she signed the release,
and she signed it on that representation; that the following day she got in touch with her attorney, and that
she gave the $20.00 to her attorney, Roy Shields. (Tr.
6'6.)
It was then stipulated that the plaintiff, or her attorney, got a check and tendered it back to the Salt Lake
Transportation Company and Green Cab Company, and
that the check has been tendered back to the plaintiff.
Mrs. Kelley further testified that her brother was present when she consented to the settlement (Tr. 70, Ab.
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19); that he was 49 years of age at the time of the settlement; that at the time the settlement \vas discussed,
Mr. Boynton did not have the release or the money present (Tr. 71); that another gentleman came out subsequently on the same day with the release and the money,
and that she signed the release in the presence of Mrs.
Allred, who acted as a witness.
:Jlr. Charles A. Boynton, a witness called on behalf
of the defendants, testified (Tr. 117, Ab. 29) that he and
Harold S. Jennings went to the residence of l\irs. Kelley; that :Jlr. Utley was there, and Mrs. Kelley was in
bed; that they went out (Tr. 116, Ab. 18) as a result
of a call from :Mr. George Utley, the brother of plaintiff,
and her Dr. Byron Reese; that Mr. Utley (Tr. 118, Ab.
30) appeared to be a man of sound health and mind;
that ~Irs. Kelley consulted Mr. Utley as to what she
should do; that :Mr. Utley expressed the opinion that
Mrs. Kelley should take what was offered; that this was
on the 21st day of February, 1940, (Tr. 119); that Mrs.
Kelley was told that the defendants would pay her
$20.00 and all doctor bills that had been incurred, and
that they would pay any doctor bills as long as she was
under treatment of Dr. Wright, if she would go to him
and take treatments until he released her; that she said,
"\Vell, all right," and later on the same day, signed the
release; that the sum of $20.00 was fixed, and she was
paid that amount to cover the cost of her household help;
that the $20.00 was given her in currency (Tr. 120) and
that the defendants later received back a cashier's check
"Tith the letter markc>cl Exhibit A from Attorney Shields;
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that the defendants have never accepted the return of the
money, and have tendered it back for the benefit of the
plaintiff. That Mrs. Kelley made a statement that she
saw no use of getting an attorney, in no way indicating
to Mr. Boynton that an attorney was employed (Tr.l21);
that she did not mention the name of Mr. Shields; that
he, Mr. Boynton, expressed the idea that the driver had
used due care, and that the defendants were not liable
for any claims she might present; that (Tr. 123, Ab. 31)
he took Mr. Jennings out with him so that he would be
present during the conversation and be able to be a witness; that on the day the release was signed, Mr. Utley
called and said that they were ready to talk settlement;
that the defendants were interested in making a settlement to save legal expense, and ·went out purposely and
took Mr. Jennings with him to make a settlement; that
(Tr. 126) they told plaintiff they were willing to pay her
$20.00 and the doctor bills, and other medical treatment,
and they didn't consider themselves liable for anything;
that Mrs. Kelley said she ought to have something for
her injury, and Mr. Boynton said that they were paying
her $20.00 because of the fact that they wanted to take
care of her, although they didn't feel that they were
liable (Tr. 127); that he didn't say she could get nothing
more, and she said nothing about an attorney; that he
told her they would authorize no further medical service until a basis of complete understanding could be arrived at: that the offer to pay the doctors' services was
conditional upon her signing the release (Tr. 128, Ab. 32)
and that if she hadn't signed the release, there would
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have been no further medical services, so far as the
defendants were concerned; that the proposition discussed with ~Irs. I~elley in consideration of which the
release ·was signed, was not only the $20.00, but the payment of all past doctor bills and future medical service.
Harold S. Jennings testified ( Tr. 131, A b. 32) to the
same effect as ~Ir. Boynton.
Clyde H. Day, a witness, called on behalf of the defendants, testified that he took the release and the
$20.00 out; that the release was signed by Mrs. Kelley
in his presence and in the presence of Mrs. Allred, and
that he left the $20.00 with Mrs. Kelley, and that she
said (Tr. 133, Ab. 33) "\Vell, that is the terms :Mr. Boyn~
ton and I agreed upon. We thought it best to agree
upon a settlement. \Ve have always been users of taxicabs, and we will have to continue to use them in the
future.''
Clarabell Kelley, called In rebuttal, said (Tr. 136,
A b. 34), that she did not say to the witness Day that
she had agreed to a friendly settlement with Mr. Boynton ; that he brought the release in to the bedroom and
said, "You can sign it here Mrs. Kelley"; that there
was a book to write on on the bed, and she put the paper
on the book and signed it.

DI.

A STATEMENT OF THE ERRORS RELIED
UPON FOR REVERSAL

Defendants and appellants contend:
1.

That the court erred in denying rlefendants'
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motion for a non-suit in that:
(a) The evidence was insufficient to sustain
or justify a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against
the defendants in that:
There was no showing of any negligence
on the part of the defendants, nor any of them.
1.

2. There was no pleading nor any evidence
sufficient to avoid the effect of the release (Exhibit 1), executed bye the plaintiff in favor of the
defendants.
2. That the Court erred in refusing and in failing
to grant defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
3. That the Court erred in giving its Instruction
No. 2 in this, that there was no dispute in the evidence
as to the circumstances under which the release (Exhibit
1) was procured, nor as to whether or not it was voluntary, the evidence conclusively showing that said release
was voluntary, nor was there any allegation or proof of
any fact sufficient in law to avoid the effect of such release, and therefore no evidence whatever to justify the
giving of said Instruction No. 2.
4. That the Court erred in its refusal to give defendants' requested Instruction No. 2.
5. That the Court erred in its refusal to give defendants' requested Instruction No. 3.
6. That the Court erred in its refusal to give defendants' requested Instruction No. 4.
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7. That the Court erred in its refusal to give defendants' requested Instruction No. 5.
8. That the Court erred in its refusal to give defendants' requested Instruction No. 6.
9. That the Court erred in denying and failing to
grant defendants' motion for a new trial, for the reason
E!et forth under assignments of error Nos. 1 and 2 hereof.

IV. A STATEMENT OF THE PARTICULAR
QUESTIONS INVOLVED FOR
DETERMINATION
The particular questions involved for determination
are these:
Is the evidence sufficient to justify or sustain a
verdict in fayor of the plaintiff and_ against the defendants on the question of negligence~
2. "\Y ere the pleadings or evidence sufficient to
avoid the effect of the release executed by plaintiff in
favor of the defendants~
1.

3. Did the Court err in giving instructions, or in
refusing to give requested instructions, in the following
particulars :
(a)
tion

Did the Court err in giving its instruc-

No.2~

(b)Did the Court err in refusing to give defendants' requested Instructions Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and
6, or any of them~
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V. BRIEF OF THE ARGUMENT
1. The evidence is not sufficient to sustain a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants on the question of negligence.
The acts of negligence alleged by plaintiff in her
complaint are as follows (Tr. 2, Ab. 3):
(a) Excessive speed, to-wit, in excess of 35
miles per hour ;
(b)

Failure to keep proper lookout for traf-

fie;
(c) Failure to keep the cab under proper, or
any, control;
(d) Failure to retard speed as the cab approached the intersection;
(e)

Applying brakes without any warning.

The only direct evidence in support of any of these
contentions was that offered by the plaintiff in her own
behalf. She testified (Tr. 47, Ab. 14) that she got into
the cab in front of the Medical Arts Building; that the
cab turned in the intersection between Main and State
Streets, and started west on South 'remple, ''and there
were no stops. He went directly right through to First
West.''
'' Q. You say there were no stops. What do
you mean by that~

"A.

He didn't have to wait for the light.
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"Q. In other words, he had the green light 1

''A. Yes.
"Q. All right."
Plaintiff testified that the car was going about 25 or 30
miles an hour when it reached the intersection of First
"\Yest, and that the brakes were suddenly applied and the
car stopped with a jerk, and threw her against the front
seat, and back down into the bottom of the car; that (Tr.
48, Ab. 14) plaintiff said to the driver, "This is a fine
place for Ine to be, down in the bottom of the cab.'' He
said, "Well, if you had been looking, you could have
braced yourself. We almost had a collision with another
car. '' That ' 'there was a car that dashed right by, as
quick as he applied the brakes-he applied the brakes
and stopped."
"Q. Yon saw the car did you'?

"A. Yes."
On cross examination (Tr. 55, Ab. 16) Mrs. Kelley
repeated that the cab was traveling between 25 and 30
miles an hour, but said that she had never driven a car,
and that (Tr. 56) the car that came in front of the cab
was going faster than the cab.
The only other evidence relating to the circumstance~
under which the accident occurred was given by the defendant Bartley (Tr. 100-111, Ab. 26-28). Bartley tes·
tified t::at he was the driver of the cab involved; that hi.'
picked up ~r r~. Kelley and her child at the Medical Arts
Building (Tr. 101, Ab. 26); that he made a U-turn in
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front of the Medical Arts Building, and proceeded west;
that as he approached First West and South Temple,
there were two cars stopped waiting for the traffic to
go north, so he slowed up; that as he got within 30 feet
of these two cars, they went on through, so he proceeded
to follow them; that he looked to the left, and it was clear
as far as he could see ; that he looked to the right and it
was clear, and then he glanced to the left again, when
another car came up in front of him, going about 40 miles
an hour; that he put on the brakes and stopped and that
Mrs. Kelley was thrown to the bottom of the cab; that
(Tr. 102, Ah. 27) when he entered the intersection he was
going between 20 and 22 miles an hour; that he did not
have room to clear the car approaching from the south by
going on through. On cross-examination (Tr. 104, Ab.
27) he confirmed his direct testimony as to his speed. He
testified that (Tr. 106) as he approached First West he
had slowed up, preparing to stop, and that he looked both
to the left and the right, and that (Tr. 107, Ab. 27) he
thought the car which dashed in front of him was going
about 40 miles an hour; that (Tr. 110, Ab. 28) he technically had the right of way, but does not think he could
have gone on through in front of the car approaching
from the south; that he had no time to give Mrs. Kelley
any warning that he was going to stop, and that (Tr.
111) the circumstances required him to put the brakes
on to stop to avoid a collision.
·The burden was on the plaintiff to prove actionable
negligence occasioning the injuries about which she complained. There is no inference of negligence from the
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fact that the plaintiff fell off the seat.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitwr does not apply for
two reasons: first, because it was not pleaded nor relied
on by the plaintiff, and our court has held (Laos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, ______ Utah ______ , 108 Pac. 2d
:254, at page :259) that:

'' * * * \Y e think one who wishes to rely
on that doctrine, as well as specifically assigned
acts of negligence, must so plead, either by a separate count or by proper allegation to the effect
that the negligence to be inferred from the general situation caused the injury, thereby notifying
the other party that he intends to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. To set out by way of
inducement a situation which itself may bespeak
a prima facie case of negligence and then follow
with allegations of specific negligence and allege
that by 'reason of such negligent acts and omissions on the part of the defendant (referring to
those specifically alleged) the plaintiff was injured,' etc., does not sufficiently put the defendant
on notice that the plaintiff is going to rely on the
situation itself to furnish any inference of negligence.''
and, secondly, because in a case like this, where another
instrumentality, to-wit, another automobile going in a
different direction, contributed to the necessity for stopping, and where other facilities involved were not under
the control of the defendants, the doctrine of re.s ipsa
lorruilur is inapplicable. Yellow Cab v. Hodgson, et al.
(Colo.), 14 Pac. 2d 1081. In that case, the decisions are
carefully reviewed, and the Court finally comes to the following conclusion, page 1085:
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'' * * * The evidence clearly established
that the injury may have resulted by reason of the
concurrent negligence of two or more persons or
causes, not both under the management and control of defendant, and therefore the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable."
As to the acts of negligence pleaded by plaintiff, we
are drawn to the following inevitable conclusions:
(a) Excessive speed. There is no evidence in support of this allegation. There is no state law making a
speed of 25 to 30 miles an hour unlawful or negligent.
No city ordinance was pleaded nor relied on relating to
rate of speed. There is no presumption that 30 miles
an hour is an excessive or careless rate of speed, and the
mere occurrence of the accident is no evidence of negligence.
(b)

Failure to keep a proper lookout for traffic.

The evidence on this point is uncontradicted and conclusive. The defendant Bartley testified (Tr. 101, Ab. 26)
that he looked both right and left, notwithstanding that
he already had the right of way, and two cars had proceeded through the intersection before him, and that he
did not see the car coming until there was nothing to do
but put on his brakes and stop. There is a presumption
of due care and not of negligence. The plaintiff also testified that she saw the car, but only just as it dashed in
front of the cab. The circumstances would indicate that
the defendant Bartley is more to be complimented for
avoiding an actual collision and serious injury to the
plaintiff, than to be charged with negligence.
(c)

Failure to keep the cab under proper or any
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control. The evidence under this heading is conclusive
in favor of the defendants. The uncontradicted evidence
is (Tr. 101, ..c\b. 26) that the cab slowed down as it approached the intersection, and that the defendant was
able by alertness and by having control, to stop the cab
and aYoid the collision.
(d) Failure to retard speed of the cab as it a pproached the intersection. The only evidence on this
point is that of the defendant Bartley (Tr. 101, Ah. 26)
that the speed \Yas retarded as the intersection was approached.
(e) Applying the brakes without warning. The
uncontradicted evidence is that there was no opportunity
to give warning to the plaintiff (Tr. 110, Ab. 28). No
warning was therefore required. The cab driver was not
thrown from his seat, and undoubtedly if the plaintiff
had to any extent been looking out for her own safety,
she would not have been unseated. Moreover, had the
driver delayed to give her warning, it is quite likely that
a collision with the car approaching from the left would
have resulted.
The plaintiff has wholly failed to discharged the burden imposed upon her of proving negligence.

2. There ,vere no pleadings, nor '\ /as any evidence
introduced sufficient to avoid the release executed by plaintiff in favor of defendants.
11

Defendants' answer (Tr. 10-11, Ab. 8) set up a
rPlPase by plaintiff in favor of defendants of all claims
growing out of the incident referred to. The release
(defendant:-;' Pxhibit 1) is as follows:
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'·'RELEASE
''For the sole consideration of TWENTY
($20.00) and NOjlOOth DOLLARS and other valuable considerations, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I do hereby release and forever discharge the Salt Lake Transportation Company, the Green Cab Transportation Company
and Louis Bartley, Cab Driver, from all claims,
demands and rights of action of any kind whatsoever, which I now have or can have on account of
injury to person or damage to property or expenses or loss of services sustained by me, or
which may hereafter arise, in consequence of an
accident which occurred on or about the tenth
day of February, 1940, at the intersection of South
Temple and First Vvest Streets, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
"It is agreed that the payment of the above
sum and other valuable considerations is not to be
construed as an admission by or on behalf of the
above named parties of any liability on account
of said accident.

"Executed at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 21st
day of February, 1940.
1fRs.

MRS.

!L

CLARABELL UTLEY KELLEY ( Sgd.)

w. ALLRED

( Sgd.)

Witness."
Plaintiff in reply (Tr. 12-13, Ab. 10-11) admits the
execution and delivery of the release, but alleges that it
was procured from her by misrepresentation and denies
that she is bound thereby. The misrepresentations relied upon are as follows (Tr. 12, Ab. 10):
(a)

That agents of the defendant stated to the
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plaintiff that she would never be able to recover any
damage against defendants by reason of her injuries;
(b) That unless she signed the release they would
pay her no sum or sums for her injuries ;
(c) That defendants would not pay plaintiff's doctor bill, nor any further expense of any kind, unless she
signed the release.
There is a further allegation (Tr. 13, Ab. 11) that
plaintiff did not know ·what she was signing. We shall
comment upon this point infra.
This release was admitted as evidence upon defendants' cross-examination of plaintiff (Tr. 62, Ab. 17),
and was a part of the record at the time defendants' motion for new trial (Tr. 79, Ab. 22) was made.
We shall discuss the adequacy of plain tiff's reply
to avoid the effect. of this release, and follow with a review of the evidence touching its execution and delivery.
Bancroft, in his work on code pleadings, Vol. 4, at
page 3989, gives the rule with respect to pleading avoidance of a release as follows:

"* * * As in other cases in pleading that a
release was obtained by fraud, the facts constituting the alleged fraud must be specifically averred,
and a mere general averment of fraud by way of
conclusion is insufficient. The existence of all of
the essential elements of actionable fraud mu-st be
slwu.'n so the representations pleaded must be as

to matters of fact as distinguished from mere expressions of opinion." (Italics onrs.)
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In 53, C. J. 1219, Sec. 35, it is pointed out that there
is no reason why a release should he invalidated for
fraudulent representation, except for the same reasons
for which any other written instrument would be, and
that for a releasor to avoid a release on the ground of
fraud, he must show (and of course he must plead to enable him to so show) in addition to the fact of a false
representation, that such representation was as to a material matter, that it was made with knowledge of its
falsity, or with reckless regard for the truth, that it was
made with the intention that it should be acted upon by
the releasor to whom it was made, that the releasor had
a right to rely on it, and that he did act in reliance upon
such representations to his damage or injury.
The rule is also laid down repeatedly in the authorities (see 53 C. J. 1221), that a mere expression of opinion as distinguished from a statement of fact, will not
be sufficient to avoid a release on the ground of fraud
or false representation, unless falsely given, not being
actually held by the person making the representation.
Thus, it has been held that statements by the releasee's
adjustor as to how long litigation might be protracted
are mere expressions of opinion, Kilby v. Charles City
Western Ry. Co., 191 Iowa 926, 183 N. lV. 371.
A statement by releasee's claim agent that if thereleasor won at the trial his counsel would keep all the
money is the expression of an opinion, and not a representation of fact, Costello v. Hayes, 249 Mass. 349, 144
N. E. 368.
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In the absence of confidential or fiduciary relations
between the parties, and unless it is made without a belief in its truth on the part of the person making it, a
false representation of law does not vitiate a release,
ralley v. Boston, etc., Railway Company (Maine), 68
Atl. 635, or the opinion of the releasee's attorney that the
releasor could not recover for his injuries, Algood t;,
Tarkio Electric etc. Co. (J!o.), 6 B. W. 2d 51; Denver etc.
Ry. Co. v. Sullivan (Colo), 41 Pac. 501; Aetna Ins. Company v. Reed, 33 Ohio State 283. If the plaintiff had, as
she contended, already consulted her attorney about the
matter, she is thereby also effectively concluded, Kilby v.
Charles City Trestern Ry. Co., 191 lou·a 926, 183 N. W.
371.

Plaintiff's reply pleads that certain representations
were made. The representations all relate to matters
of opinion or of law. There is no allegation anywhere in
the reply that the representations were false, nor that
they were known to be false by the persons making the
representations, nor that they ·were made with the intention that the plaintiff should act upon then1. Certainly the statement made to the plaintiff that unless she
signed the release she would receive no sum whatsoever,
nor would her existing and future doctor bills be paid,
was not false, and forms no basis for avoidance of the
release. If that were so, no compromise would be possible; cmnpromises are almost ahvays based upon a disputed question of liability.
No confidential relation between plaintiff and the
defendants is pleaded, nor did any in fact exist. Plaintiff
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had her own independent advice. There is no pleading
of duress, nor was it present in fact. The settlement took
place 11 days after the injury, and at a time, according
to all the physicians' evidence, when the plaintiff was
suffering only mildly, if at all, and in the presence of
her brother, and a considerable interval elasped between
the discussion and the presentation of the release, during which interval she could have consulted her brother,
or her attorney, or have changed her mind without any
consultation.
The allegation that plaintiff signed the release without knowing what she was signing is not supported by
any evidence, and in view of the fact that she was not
hurried or rushed in any way, and that the release conforms to the verbal understanding had prior to its execution, and that she is presumed to know the contents of
what she signed, such defense would not be available to
her in any event.
The evidence does not support any case of fraud in
the procurement of the release.
Mrs. Kelley testified (Tr. '61, Ab. 17) that the signature "Clarabell Utley Kelley" on defendants' exhibit
1 (the release), (Tr. 61, Ab. 17), is her signature.

"Q. And you signed that?
"A.

Yes, sir.

'' Q.

In the presence of Mrs. l\L \V. Allred?''

''A.

Yes.
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''Q.

On the 21st day of February, 19401

''A. Yes.

"'Q.
Ab. 17).

''A.

~\nd

you received at that time $20.00 (Tr. 62,

Yes."

On redirect examination (Tr. 63, Ab. 17) Mrs. Kelley
testified that it was a week or longer after the injury
when ~Ir. Boynton and the other gentlemen came out to
her house; that her back was hurting her, and she was
nervous; that :Jir. Boynton and the other gentlemen told
her they would allow her $20.00 for help (Tr. 64, Ab.
13); that she told them she thought she was entitled to
more than that, at least for her injuries, and that they
told her she \Yas not, that $20.00 was all she would get,
and that if she didn't take that, she would get nothing
at all; that they asked her if she had employed an attorney, and she said: "\Yell, they (apparently the plaintiff and her advisors) had discussed an attorney.'' That
she signed the release because she was in need of medical
attention, and they told her she ·wouldn't get any more
medical attention unless she signed it.

'' Q. And so you signed this document upon that
representation 1
''A.

Yes, sir.''

She further testified (Tr. 66, Ab. 18) that after
signing the release and taking the $20.00, she got in touch
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with her attorney, and caused him to return the $20.00
and to write a letter attempting to repudiate the release.
It further appears that the $20.00 was paid to her in
cash, that the tendered return was by check, and that
the check has been re-tendered to the plaintiff. She further testified (Tr. 70, Ab. 19) that her brother, a man
of 49 years of age, was with her when the settlement was
agreed upon, and that he approved of the settlement; that
the conversation relating to settlement was had during
the daytime with Mr. Boynton and the other gentleman,
and that a third gentleman, Mr. Clyde Day, came out
with the release and the money later on the same day.
(Tr. 71, Ab. 19.)
Mrs. Kelley testified (Tr. 98, A b. 25) that at the
time settlement was discussed with Mr. Boynton and the
other gentleman at her home, she had a telephone and
could have had her brother telephone Mr. Shields if she
had wished to.
Witness Boynton testified (Tr. 117, Ab. 29) that on
the day the release was signed, Mr. Utley, the plaintiff's
brother, called him; that pursuant to that call, he and
Harold S. Jennings went to the residence of Mrs. Kelley,
and that Mr. Utley was there; that Mrs. Kelley was still
in bed (Tr. 118, Ab. 30); that a conversation was had
with Mrs. Kelley in the presence of ~1:r. Utley; that 1\{rs.
Kelley consulted Mr. Utley as to ·what she should do, and
he expressed an opinion that he thought she should agree
to take what was offered. Mr. Boynton told Mrs. Kelley
that the defendants would pay her expenses for the help
she had had, and that they would pay all the doctor bills
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that she had so far incurred, and that th0y would further pay doctor bills so long as she was under the treatment of Dr. Spencer Wright, if she would go to him
and take treatments until he released her (Tr. 119, Ab.
30): that she said, "well, all right," and signed the release later on the san1e day; that the $20.00 was paid
her to royer the expense of household help. That (Tr.
120, Ab. 30) the $20.00 'Yas in currency and the defendants later received back a cashier's check in connection
"·ith the letter marked plaintiff's Exhibit A; that they
did not accept the return of that money, and have tendered it back for the benefit of plaintiff; that (Tr. 121,
Ab. 30) the plaintiff did not mention Mr. Shields. 1\ir.
Boynton expressed the idea that the defendants' driver
had used due care and that the defendants were not liable
for any claim which she might present.
On cross-examination (Tr. 121, Ab. 30) :Mr. Boynton
testified that he took Mr. Jennings along with him so he
would be present at any conversation that was had; that
he did not consider the defendants liable at all (Tr. 123,
Ab. 31) but they were interested in talking settlement
to avoid legal expense; that (Tr. 126) Mrs. ICelley said
she thought she ought to have something for her injuries,
but defendants told her they didn't consider themselves
liable for anything, and when they told her that defendants would continue to pay for the doctor's expense, thai
was conditioned upon her signing the release.
Clyde I-I. Day testified (Tr. 132, Ab. 33) that he is
employed by Salt Lake Transportation Company; that on
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ton to deliver a release and $20.00 to Mrs. Kelley, which
he did about 10 o'clock on tlie date the release was signed;
that the release was signed in his presence and in the
presence of Mrs. Allred, the witness thereto, and (Tr.
133, A b. 33) he left $20.00 with Mrs. Kelley; that he was
met at the door of Mrs. Kelley's residence by Mrs. Allred, who ushered him into the bedroom, where he found
Mrs. Kelley propped up in bed reading a book. He told
her he had brought the release to be signed, and she said,
"Well, that is the terms Mr. Boynton and I agreed upon.
\Ve thought it best to agree upon a settlement * * *"
and at that time she signed the release, and he took it
back to the office.
On cross-examination (Tr. 134, Ab. 33) Mr. Day testified that Mrs. Kelley read the release ; that she looked
at it at least three or four minutes before she signed it;
that l\frs. Allred, the witness, signed the release in the
bedroom at the time Mrs. Kelley signed it.
There are cases which hold that grossly inadequate
consideration may in itself raise a presumption of fraud.
Inadequacy of consideration is not pleaded in this case,
nor under the evidence did it in fact exist. The consideration which plaintiff was to receive was the $20.00 cash,
payment in full for all medical services theretofore rendered her, and she was to continue going to Dr. Wright
and receiving treatment at defendant's expense until Dr.
Wright released her. It does not appear that the verdic1·.
rendered in her favor by the jury would have netted her
any substantial amount in addition to the consideration
for the release.
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This case is presented to the Court more for the purpose of determining whether compromises and releases
are to be upheld, or whether they shall be set aside on
some slight provocation rather than because of any excess verdict. It is defendants' ·dew that compromise and
release of doubtful claims for personal injury is highly
favored by the law, and that any contract by which there
is a fair meeting of the minds of the parties to that end
should be upheld by the courts. If there was a meeting
of the minds of the parties '"ithout fraud or unfair conduct, the contract should stand, although subsequent
events might show that either party made a bad bargain. Such compromises cannot be avoided for a mistake
of fact, nor can the releasor avoid the effect of her agreement on the ground that at the time she signed the paper,
she did not read it, or know its contents. The only fraud
which may be availed of in an action at law to avoid a
formally executed release of the claim sued on is material misrepresentation or deceit or trickery practiced
to induce the execution of a release which the signer
never intended to execute, and on which the minds of the
contracting parties never met.

3. The Court erred in giving its Instruction No. 2.
and in refusing to give defendants' requested
Instructions :Nos. 2. 3. 5, and 6.
(a)

ERROR IN

IKSTRUCTIO~~

GIVEX

In~truction No. 2 as given by the Court is as follows
(rrr. 144, A h. 35) :
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lease is binding upon the plaintiff. There is some
dispute in the testimony as to the circumstances
under which that release was procured. A release
should be voluntary, and with a full knowledge
of all of the facts. So, you are instructed that it
is claimed by the plaintiff that she was induced
to sign said release by statements made by the
persons who procured the smne, as shown by the
instructions of the Court. You are therefore instructed that if you find from the ·evidence that
the officers of said companies went to the home
of said plaintiff and there stated and represented
to her that they had made an investigation of said
accident, and that it was a non-liability case; that
if plaintiff brought an action to recover damages
she could not prevail because there was no liability on the part of the company on account of
said accident, and that the payment of twenty dollars, which they were offering her, was a mere
gratuity, a customary gesture of good will in nonliability cases, and that if she were to bring a suit
against the defendants she could not recover any
damages, and sajd offer would be withdrawn, and
if you further believe from the evidence that the
plaintiff was at the time suffering from pain and
distress by reason of her injury, and was in need
of medical care, and it was represented to her by
the officers of said defendant companies who procured said release, that unless she signed the release they would not furnish her with additional
medical care and attention, and if you further believe that plaintiff relied upon such statements,
and believed them to be true, and that the plaintiff had no money with which to employ physicians
for her medical care and attention, then I instruct
you that said release would not be bindina- upon
plaintiff and you should disregard the sa~e, and
should award her such damages, if any, that you
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1nay find she is entitled to by rPason of her in-

juries, not ('XePt•ding, howPYt:r, the sum of one
thousand and fifty dollars, o:w thousand dollar~
general damages, and thirty-five dollars doctor
bill.''
It ·was duly excepted to (Tr. 14, Ab. 42). The vices
of this instruction are as follows:

(1) EYen if there had been any evidence upon
which the jury could have concluded that the representations referred to in the instruction were made and
were the procuring cause of the release, the representations referred to were not sufficient, as a matter of law,
to avoid the release. \Y e have expressed our views on
this matter under point No. 2, supra, and will not repeat
them here. The Court, it will be noted (Tr. 145), instructed the jury that the release is not binding upon
plaintiff if these presentations were made. We think
think that neither the law nor the evidence justifies such
an instruction.
A further provision of the instruction reads:
'' * * * A release should be voluntary, and
with a full knowledge of all of the facts. So, you
are instructed that it is claimed by the plaintiff
that she was induced to sign said release by statements made by the persons who procured the
same, as shown by the instructions of the Court.''

(2)

There was no evidence to support such an instruction. All the evidence of the plaintiff, as well as that of
the defendants, shows that the release was voluntary,
and with a full knowledge of the facts. There were differences of opinion as to the law applicable to the facts,
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that is to say, whether the plaintiff could or could not
recover in an action. The only other representation actually complained of was the statement that the defendants
would pay her nothing and authorize no further medical
service unless she signed the release. That was a mere
expression of intention, and is not an actionable representation. The last clause of this instruction, "as shown
by the instructions of the court,'' is misleading because
there were no other instructions relating to the release,
or the circumstances under which it was given.
(3) There are other material matters in this instruction which are not supported by the evidence. For
instance:

"* * * You are therefore instructed that if
you find from the evidence that the officers of said
companies went to the home of said plaintiff and
there stated and represented to her that they had
made an investigation of said accident, and that
it was a non-liability case; * * * ''
Nowhere in the evidence can we find any such statement or representation as this. It is not claimed by
the plaintiff in her testimony; there is no evidence for
its support.
(4)

Again, (Tr. 144):
"* * * that the payment of twenty dollars,
which they were offering her, was a mere gratuity,
a customary gesture of good will in non-liability
cases. * * *''

there is no evidence to support this portion of the instruction. Certainly the plaintiff did not testify to it.
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J.Ir. Boynton testified (Tr. 26, ...:\.-b. 31) that he told her
that the defendants did not feel that they were liable for
anything, but they were willing to pay her the expense
she had been put to, and authorize the medical service
to save legal expense (Tr. 123, Ab. 31). There is no evidence anywhere in the record that it was a ''customary
gesture of good wHl," or a "mere gratuity."
(5)

The Court further instructed the jury that:
* * * if you further believe from the evidence
that the plaintiff was at the time suffering from
pain and distress by reason of her injury, and
was in need of medical care, and it was represented to her by the officers of said defendant companies who procured said release, that unless she
signed the release they would not furnish her with
additional medical care and attention, and if you
further believe that plaintiff relied upon such
statements, and believed them to be true, and that
the plaintiff had no money with which to employ
pl1ysicians for her medical care and attention,
then I instruct you that said release would not be
binding.* * *"

This portion of the instructions bears an aspect of
duress, but no such influence was pleaded, and certainly
it did not exist. Ten days had elapsed since the accident,
during all of which time the plaintiff had had independent advice, including, according to her own statement,
consultation with an attorney, and moreover, after the
adjustment was agreed upon, there was a considerable
interval before the money and the release were brought
to her, so the release could not be avoided upon that
ground. Moreover, no necessity for medical treatment
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existed at that time. The testimony of Dr. Anderson and
Dr. Wright is conclusive upon this point. There was no
basis either in the pleadings or in the evidence for such
an instruction. The authorities agree that "it is error for
the trial court to mis-state the evidence on a material
point, even though the testimony is elsewhere correctly
stated, and requested instructions mis-stating the evidence are properly refused," 64 C. J. 709, and again, "Instructions relating generally to evidence and matters of
fact must be correct and not too broad o_r misleading.''
64 c. J. 705.
(b)

ERROR IN REFUSING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) It was error to refuse defendants' requested
Instruction No. 2 (Tr. 21, 22, Ab. 39, 40) because neither
the pleadings nor the evidence presented a proper case
for ignoring the release. This matter has been discussed
under point No.1 supra.
(2) Defendants' requested Instruction No. 3 (Tr.
23, Ab. 23) reads as follows:
"The Court instructs you that in this case the
positions of the plaintiff and the defendants were
at all times adverse; that no confidential or other
fiduciary relationship existed between plaintiff
and defendants, and that there vTas no duty upon
the defendants to advise plajntiff to emplo:v an attorney or other1vise to tah:e counsel before executing the release which she signed in this case.''
There was no pleading of a fiduciary relationship,
and yet plaintiff has contended, apparently, that there
was some duty on the part of the defendants to advise
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
her to employ an attorney. or to get outside, independent
advice. and while there h;; evidence that she had independent adYirP, both from her brother and elsewhere,
it is defendants' YiPw that defendants stood in no confidential relationship to her, and were under no duty to
advise her in that regard. It was for this reason that the
instruction was asked for. 'Ve think it should have been
given.
(3) Defendants' requested Instruction No. 5 is as
follows:
"The Court instructs you that if you find
from the evidence that the plaintiff was a person
of legal age, and that she signed the document in
evidence freely and voluntarily, then the matter of
consideration is not open for deliberation, as the
plaintiff is bound by the consideration provided
for in connection with the execution and delivery
of the release.''
This request should have been granted, and this instruction given, because it is alleged in reply (Tr. 13,
Ab. 11) that the plain tiff signed the release ' 'without
knowing the contents or purport of the same.''
She endeavored on the witness stand to show that at
the time she signed the release she had not read it, and
did not understand it. (Tr. 136.) This issue was raised by
the pleadings, evidence and arguments, and there is no
instruction relating thereto. It is material and a proper
instruction was requested and should have been granted.
(4) Defendants' requested Instruction No. 6 (Tr.
140, Ab. 42) was as follows:
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''The defendants request the Court to instruct the jury that if the jury finds that the defendants did in fact state to the plaintiff that they
were not liable, and she could not recover, then
the jury should further determine whether such
expression of opinion was honestly entertained
and honestly made, and if the jury finds that such
expressions of opinion were made and were honestly entertained, then the Court instructs the
jury that the expression of such opinion would
not constitute misrepresentation, and that the release could not be avoided on that ground.''
If the expression that the defendants were not liable
was made by the defendants' representatives to the
plaintiff, nevertheless, if that opinion was honestly entertained, it could not constitute actionable fraud or a
ground for avoiding the release, 26 C. J. 1079-80-81;
Nielsen v. Portland Gas & Coke Co. (Ore.), 147 Pac. 554;
Davis v. Higgins (Okla.), 217 Pac. 193; Anderson v.
J(ttrtz, 66 Colo. 215, 182 Pac. 533. The decision in the
latter case refers to the earlier Colorado case of Kirkpatrick v. Miller, 135 Pac. 780, in which it is held that all
of the elements of actionable fraud, including the making
of representations known to be false, must be pleaded and
proved.

CONCLUSION
Compromise and settlement of controversies are favored by the law, and should not be interferred with for
unsubstantial reasons. Clearly, a settlement should not
be opened up where the question of liability is extremely
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doubtful, and when the only attack upon the release is
that it ·was procured by representations that the defendants were not liable, and that unless the release was
executed, they would make no payment to plaintiff. These
representations were not false, and in any event, were
not actionable.
The right of parties to compose their differences,
under circumstances such as those here disclosed, should
be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
INGEBRETSEN, RAY, RAWLINS
& CHRISTENSEN,
Attorneys for Defendants and
Appellants.
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